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Getting Jurors to Awesome
Cortney E. LollarFN1
A 2011 American Bar Association report on the death penalty in Kentucky revealed that a shocking
two-thirds of the 78 peopleFN2 sentenced to death in Kentucky since reinstatement of the death
penalty in 1976 have had their sentences overturned on appeal. Kentucky’s reversal rate is more than
twice the national average, with a 31% reversal rate in capital cases and almost four times the 17%
national reversal rate in all other case types.FN3 With a sentence as irreversible as death, troubling
does not begin to describe the depth of concern many experience when viewing such a startling
statistic.
A closer look at the cases behind this extreme reversal rate reveals some surprising patterns. Two of
the more consistent factors leading to the reversal of death sentences in Kentucky are prosecutorial
comments, which lead the jury to feel a diminished sense of responsibility in their ultimate
sentencing decision, and jury instruction error. This essay focuses on the former, the minimization of
the jury’s sense of responsibility, a factor in 12% of reversals.FN4 However, jury instructions are
intimately intertwined with how the jury navigates and perceives their role. Accordingly, this essay
will also discuss how aggravating and mitigating jury instructions play a role in minimizing the jury’s
function, as well. Furthermore, this essay explores whether the concerns related to the minimization
of a juror’s role are confirmed by empirical evidence, and concludes by suggesting ways to help jurors
acknowledge the full weight of their responsibility in the event the death penalty continues to be a
punishment in Kentucky.
The Jury’s Discomfort with Its Role in Capital Sentencing
The jury’s role in sentencing is rooted in Supreme Court jurisprudence that re-establishes the
constitutionality of the death penalty in the mid-1970s. Under the scheme permitted by the Supreme
Court in Gregg v. Georgia, a case which led many states to reinstate the death penalty, the Court
approved of a bifurcated trial where juries are given “guided discretion” in their decision at the
penalty phase of a capital trial.FN5 Specifically, the framework authorized by the Court instructed the
jury to look at certain statutory and non-statutory aggravating and mitigating factors in determining
the appropriate punishment.FN6 The Court viewed the jury’s role as central to the decision, calling
the jury a “significant and reliable objective index of contemporary values because it is so directly
involved [in the proceedings].”FN7
Yet many jurors, both then and now, remain quite uncomfortable with the role delineated for them in
Gregg. As one scholar has suggested, “many death penalty jurors who are confronted with the
anguishing moral dilemma of a death sentencing decision seek to avoid the perception that they bear
personal moral responsibility for making that decision.”FN8 In large part, this avoidance is likely
because “[c]apital trials are unique in American jurisprudence and, indeed, in human experience.
Under no other circumstance does a group of ordinary citizens calmly and rationally contemplate
taking the life of another, all the while acting under color of law.”FN9 Generally, individuals seek to
avoid being in a position to make the decision as to whether another person lives or dies. Yet, in this
context, jurors are asked to put their normal aversion aside and decide the ultimate fate of another.
In order to eliminate some of the uneasiness they may feel, jurors may try to distance themselves
from the decision. It is therefore not surprising that attorneys trying to persuade a juror to sentence
someone to death might identify and utilize this discomfort. After Gregg, prosecutors around the
country, including those in Kentucky, often attempted to alleviate juror distress by convincing them
that their decision was not the final one, thereby allowing them to be more comfortable imposing a
death sentence.
As indicated by the number of reversals in Kentucky on this ground, courts, including the Supreme
Court, did not embrace this approach. In a 1985 case, Caldwell v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court
found it “constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a
sentencer who [had] been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness
of the defendant’s death rests elsewhere.”FN10
In Caldwell, Bobby Caldwell was sentenced to death in Mississippi for shooting and killing the owner
of a small grocery store during the course of robbing the store.FN11 During the initial sentencing
proceeding, Caldwell’s attorney asked the jury to show mercy, saying:
[E]very life is precious and as long as there’s life in the soul of a person, there is hope . . . . [D]eath is
final. So I implore you to think deeply about this matter . . . . I’m sure [the prosecutor is] going to say
to you that Bobby Caldwell is not a merciful person, but I say unto you he is a human being. That he
has a life that rests in your hands. You can give him life or you can give him death. It’s going to be
your decision . . . . You are the judges and you will have to decide his fate. It is an awesome
responsibility, I know – an awesome responsibility.FN12
The prosecutor responded to defense counsel’s notion by minimizing the jury’s role in sentencing,
stating: “[T]hey would have you believe that you’re going to kill this man and they know—they know
that your decision is not the final decision. My God, how unfair can you be? Your job is reviewable . . . .
[T]he decision you render is automatically reviewable by the Supreme Court. Automatically . . .”FN13
In rejecting the government’s argument, the Supreme Court confirmed its belief that capital juries
would “view their task as the serious one of determining whether a specific human being should die
at the hands of the State.”FN14 In fact, Caldwell’s counsel was echoing the precise words of Justice
Harlan, who, in a previous case, identified the jury’s “awesome responsibility” in capital cases.FN15
In Caldwell, Justice Marshall embraced the idea that a sense of moral responsibility not only would
affect, but also should affect a jury’s decision in deciding what sentence to impose.FN16 The Court
envisioned this model of jury service as essential to the death penalty’s continued constitutionality
under the Eighth Amendment.FN17 According to the Court, the jury should contemplate the
individuality of a defendant and whether this particular individual should be given or denied mercy in
making its sentencing decision.FN18 In fact, the Court premised its acceptance of capital punishment
on jurors not evading the mantle of the responsibility vested in them.FN19
Although the Caldwell Court reiterated its confidence in jurors taking their role as life or death
decision-maker quite seriously, it simultaneously acknowledged the real discomfort many capital
jurors feel about making that ultimate decision. According to the Court, capital juries are “made up of
individuals placed in a very unfamiliar situation and called on to make a very difficult and
uncomfortable choice. They are confronted with evidence and argument on the issue of whether
another should die, and they are asked to decide that issue on behalf of the community.”FN20 As a
result, the Court continued, “[I]n the capital sentencing context there are specific reasons to fear
substantial unreliability as well as bias in favor of death sentences,”FN21 especially when jurors are
encouraged to view their role in determining someone’s fate as something less momentous than it
actually is. Justice Marshall’s opinion recognizes how effortlessly jurors could abandon the weighty
sense of moral responsibility, and rejects any attempts to keep the jury from being aware of the true
consequences of its decision during the penalty process.
A Closer Look at the Assumptions Underlying Caldwell
The Caldwell Court’s endorsement of jurors as the moral compass for the community and admonition
of the government for trying to minimize juror’s acceptance of this role, builds on a central,
unexamined premise. The Court assumes a reduced sense of responsibility will affect a jury’s
decision. More specifically, it presumes that minimizing a jury’s role will reduce the sense of
responsibility the jury feels.FN22 If jurors are torn about imposing a death sentence, the Court
reasons, the knowledge of judicial or appellate review might allow them to more readily invoke the
death sentence. Jurors assume that a court will be the ultimate arbiter, with the result being a less
reliable decision.FN23 Conversely, a sentencer who believes that she alone is responsible for the
defendant’s fate will take her moral obligations more seriously, thus resulting in a more reliable
decision.
At the time Caldwell was decided, there was little evidence, empirical or otherwise, to support or
refute the Court’s claim. As a result, notwithstanding the Court’s holding, questions remained as to
whether a reduced sense of responsibility actually affected a jury’s decision. Additional questions
remained as to whether comments suggesting that courts would review and revise a jury’s finding
would reduce how a juror viewed their responsibility in imposing death.
In light of the high reversal rate in capital cases in Kentucky on this minimization ground, both before
and after Caldwell, these questions seem important to answer. The next section looks at both the
empirical evidence and the theoretical underpinnings supporting the Court’s view.
Empirical Evidence on Minimization of the Jury’s Role
Since Caldwell, several empirical studies have examined the question of whether a reduced sense of
responsibility affects a jury’s decision, separate from any comments by prosecutors or judges
attempting to minimize the jury’s role. The results support Caldwell’s holding and the legitimacy of
Kentucky’s reversals on this basis.
Many former capital jurors who were interviewed indicated that they see the defendant, the law, or
the court as primarily responsible for the outcome of a capital sentencingFN24 rather than
acknowledging their own role in the decision.FN25 Numerous studies have shown that capital jurors
believe the person most responsible for the punishment is the defendant himself, viewing it as the
inevitable result of the defendant’s crime.FN26 These same jurors also tend to believe the law
commands a particular sentence, making the decision one that is out of their hands.FN27 In fact,
eight out of ten former capital jurors interviewed feel the defendant or the law is most responsible for
a defendant’s punishment.FN28 Although these jurors consider “the law” to be what statutes
command, studies also suggest that a majority of jurors believe the defendant’s fate is actually up to
the judge and appeals court.FN29 Even without prosecutors giving their imprimatur to this view,
jurors tend to take judicial review and ultimate decision-making as a given.FN30
Troublingly, only a small minority of capital jurors believes they, either individually or collectively as
a jury, bear the responsibility for a defendant’s punishment.FN31 As a result, one study revealed that
jurors in 75% of the capital trials reviewed found no need to deliberate in the penalty phase,
indicating that the law took responsibility away from them.FN32[32] Although, technically speaking,
the jury is solely tasked with recommending a sentence to the judge, the law on this issue is not quite
so simple.
It is true that under Kentucky law, jurors recommend a sentence to the judge,FN33 and indeed, state
law requires Kentucky Supreme Court review of a capital sentence.FN34 In the strictest sense, then,
neither prosecutors nor judges are misstating the law by telling jurors that their role is to
“recommend” a sentence to a judge, who ultimately makes the final sentencing decision. Subsequent
federal appellate decisions have confirmed that such a statement, in and of itself, is not error.FN35
Yet, that is not the whole story. Kentucky allows a judge to impose a death sentence only if the jury
votes for death. The jury alone determines which aggravating circumstances authorize a death
sentence.FN36 Of the thirty-two states with the death penalty, only three permit judges to override
life verdicts issued by jury recommendation, and Kentucky is not one of them.FN37 Although it is
difficult to get the numbers,FN38 evidence suggests that judges rarely override a death sentence in
favor of a life sentence.FN39 In the instances when they do, “[b]y far the most common reason for
judicial overrides of death recommendations is the defendant’s mental illness or mental
retardation.”FN40 Additionally, judges seem to override jury death verdicts when there is a likelihood
that the decision will get overturned on appeal.FN41 Thus, juries really do play the most critical role
in determining whether a defendant receives a sentence of death, as it is almost always their
recommendation that makes the ultimate call.
Caldwell is still good law, and several Kentucky Supreme Court opinions have continued to give teeth
to its holding, despite the statute’s use of the word “recommend.”FN42 In Bussell v. Commonwealth,
for example, the Court remarked, “[t]his Court has repeatedly denounced the use of the term
‘recommend,’ despite the fact that it appears in the sentencing statute.”FN43 Similarly, in an
unreported 2007 case, the Court admonished a prosecutor for telling the jury, “I’m the one who may
have to recommend that he die. I’m the one who is responsible; well, you are not responsible.”FN44
Although the Court reversed the sentence on other grounds, it took pains to reiterate “any actions by
the Commonwealth which would tend to lessen in the minds of the jury their awesome
responsibility” must be discouraged and should not be repeated on retrial.FN45
The law in Kentucky continues to be what the Kentucky Supreme Court articulated in its 1988 Grooms
v. Commonwealth opinion:
[T]he instructions on the penalty phase should
require the jury to fix the punishment. As a matter
of law, the punishment fixed by the jury shall be
considered to be a recommendation by the jury to
the trial judge, who will then have the ultimate
responsibility of fixing the penalty as prescribed by
statute.FN46
The standard jury instruction reflects this understanding, explaining to the jury: “[y]ou [have now
received] additional evidence from which you shall determine whether there are mitigating or
aggravating facts and circumstances bearing upon the question of punishment, following which you
shall fix a sentence for the Defendant.”FN47 Thus, while the jury is solely tasked with recommending
a sentence to the judge, because of the critical role jurors play in determining that sentence, jurors
are to be told they are fixing the punishment.
There are some scenarios where concern about capital jurors trying to avoid their responsibility for a
defendant’s ultimate sentence arises more regularly. When jurors believe the defendant killed under
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, they tend to assign a greater role to the
judge in determining the penalty.FN48 Jurors also are less willing to accept responsibility when
female defendants are sentenced than males.FN49 Jurors who are active in politics also tend to shift
responsibility to the judge, where as those for whom religion influenced their sentencing decision
tended to accept a greater share of responsibility.FN50
By way of contrast, there are other scenarios in which former capital jurors are more willing to be
held accountable for their role in a defendant’s sentence. “Jurors report a greater sense of
responsibility when the vicious or brutal nature of the killing played a role in their decision-
making.”FN51 Similarly, “jurors accepted increased responsibility if they believed the defendant had
planned or intended to kill the victim, even if [the defendant] was not the [person to actually commit
the act].”FN52
At least one study has shown that a correlation exists between rejection of responsibility at capital
sentencing and a decision to sentence a defendant to death.FN53 Believing the decision would
ultimately be the court’s made it easier for jurors to impose the death penalty.FN54 In other words,
jurors who assign sentencing responsibility elsewhere are somewhat more likely to impose death,
just as the Caldwell Court presumed.
Jurors Seek to Minimize Their Role
Separate from jurors’ beliefs that the defendant, the law, or the court are the ultimate arbiter of a
capital defendant’s fate, many jurors also seek other methods of downplaying their own significance.
Numerous studies have shown that capital jurors distance themselves from responsibility from their
sentencing decisions.FN55 Consistent with the Caldwell Court’s fears, capital jurors often “focus
solely on the portion of the judge’s sentencing instructions that tells them they are only making a
recommendation in order to absolve themselves of responsibility.”FN56 Again, such a result is not
surprising. As one commentator noted, “jurors are predisposed to use almost any available
information to downplay their responsibility for the death sentencing decision.”FN57
Common Juror Misinformation and Misunderstandings
Many jurors rely on common lore and misinformation learned outside the courtroom in making their
decisions in a capital case. One common misperception is that if a jury does not vote for death, a
dangerous defendant will be walking the streets in a short period of time. The possibility of parole in
a case where the jury imposes death weighed heavily on jurors, and often was a major consideration
in their decision to impose the death penalty.FN58 In a recent survey of former Kentucky capital
jurors by Professor Marla Sandys, jurors erroneously believed that if they did not impose the death
penalty, convicted defendants would be back on the street in ten years.FN59 A death sentence
becomes insurance against the possibility of a return to society.FN60 Thus, these same jurors appear
to assume that at least if they impose death, the offender will not be back in the community any time
soon, even if the execution is not carried out. Jurors also have significant doubts that most death
sentences will be carried out.FN61 As a result, jurors vote for death to “send a message,” in the words
of the Caldwell Court,FN62 as to how serious and heinous they view the defendant’s crime.
Confusing and unclear jury instructions also play a significant role in jurors’ capital decisions. Part of
the expectation for jurors, as articulated in Caldwell, is that they will evaluate mitigating evidence
that might justify exercising mercy as part of their moral responsibility in death penalty cases. But, it
is not uncommon for courts to improperly instruct jurors on what is required for aggravation and
mitigation or to give instructions that jurors find confusing.FN63 Because the instructions are not
clear with respect to what is expected of jurors at the penalty phase of a capital trial, there is the very
real possibility that jurors are imposing death because they do not understand how aggravation and
mitigation actually work. Further, given their tendency to assume courts have the final word, they
assume a court will review their decision and “fix it” if they make an error.
Juror confusion over mitigation, unfortunately, is not unusual, both generally and in Kentucky. More
than 79% of former Kentucky capital jurors did not understand that mitigation evidence does not
have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt or found by a unanimous jury, and an additional 15%
did not know what the standard for mitigation was.FN64 At least two death sentences in Kentucky
were reversed because of a failure to properly instruct the jury that mitigating factors do not have to
be found unanimously by the jury.FN65 These numbers are consistent with national studies showing
that, where jurors recognized the existence of mitigating factors, they did not know “what the law
allows, or requires, them to do with such evidence.”FN66
Capital jurors in Kentucky also misunderstand aggravation. More than 15% of interviewed Kentucky
capital jurors did not understand that aggravating circumstances have to be found beyond a
reasonable doubt.FN67 Likewise, at least one jury was not told that all jurors have to agree on which
aggravating factor counsels in favor of death.FN68 In interviews conducted in several states, a
substantial number of capital jurors reported that the wording of judicial instructions misled them
into believing that they must sentence the defendant to death once they found the presence of a
statutory aggravating circumstance.FN69 In Kentucky, a recent study found that more than 40% of
former capital jurors believed the law required them to impose the death penalty if evidence proved
that the defendant’s conduct was heinous, vile, or depraved, or if they believed the defendant would
be dangerous in the future.FN70 In other words, those jurors believe that the presence of such
characteristics is sufficient in and of itself to require imposition of the death penalty.FN71
Aggravating and mitigating factors were nowhere in their decision-making process. Proof of a
particularly gruesome act, in these jurors’ minds, meant the death penalty must be imposed.
Part of the problem is poorly worded and confusing jury instructions. Analyzing Kentucky’s jury
instructions for readability, Professor Sandys found that most of the jury instructions relevant to
death sentencing require more than a college education to understand. Such a finding is striking in a
state where approximately 20% of the population has a college degree.FN72 Similarly, Sandys found
that ease of reading was revealingly low, usually ranging between 30 and 40, but going as low as 15
on a scale of 1-100, with 60-70 being the ideal.FN73
Yet, the Supreme Court has upheld similar instructions on two occasions. In a 1998 case reminiscent
of Kentucky’s cases addressing the issue of mitigation, the state of Virginia had an instruction
indicating that aggravating factors must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt before death could be
imposed.FN74 But the instruction was silent on the subject of mitigating factors, and no other
mitigation instruction was provided. The Supreme Court found that Virginia had no affirmative
obligation to instruct on mitigation and that the mere absence of such an instruction was not error,
or a denial of the authority to consider mitigating evidence.FN75 Even two years later when another
Virginia jury sent a note to the trial judge expressing confusion over this instruction by inquiring
whether a finding of guilt on one count made it their “duty as a jury to issue the death penalty,” the
Court found the Constitution required “nothing more” than the judge repeat the instruction to the
jury.FN76
Prosecutorial comments that draw on instructions telling the jury their sentencing decision is “only a
recommendation” likely do play a role in helping jurors minimize their responsibility for their
decision to impose death. In a study of Indiana jurors who were instructed by the judge that their
verdict was “only a recommendation,” most jurors specifically remembered that portion of the
judge’s instruction.FN77 In fact one juror took it so far as to deny having played any role in the
defendant’s sentencing once the trial was over.FN78 The reality is that she recommended a death
sentence, and the defendant received a death sentence from the trial judge.FN79 Other jurors used
the idea that the jury’s sentence was just a recommendation to convince holdout jurors to make a
decision.FN80
When jurors are confused about their basic role, it is easy for them to fall back on the presumption
that “the law” requires whatever sentence they impose, and if they are wrong, a court will step in
because their decision is only a suggestion that courts do not have to endorse. The presence of
unclear and/or confusing jury instructions only exacerbates the problem.
The Difficulty in Humanizing Capital Defendants at a Bifurcated Hearing
Jurors struggle with aggravation and mitigation, causing them to further abdicate their role as
decision-makers in capital trials. As one recent commentator noted,
[D]ehumanization during the fact-finding phase within a capital trial is predominantly established
through procedural instrumentalities that unleash negative emotions through expressions of fear
and outrage. Often it acts as a bulwark against positive emotions of empathy and compassion that
the defense attempts to introduce in the later phase of the trial to humanize the defendant. Thus,
process instrumentalities of the death penalty may permanently disable the humanization
process.FN81
During the trial proceedings, “the prosecutor must portray in a vivid and compelling way, the
circumstances and nature of the killing.”FN82 A prosecutor who does her job well portrays the pain
and violence of the event in a way that brings it emotionally home to jurors, and jurors have an
obligation to view the graphic representations of such pain and violence or else they are abdicating
their role as jurors.FN83 As such, the government starts creating moral outrage around a “story of
monstrosity” before the trial so that by the time of sentencing, that individual is completely “devoid
of personhood and stripped of humanity.”FN84 Against this backdrop, mitigation evidence can
barely begin to enter into a juror’s consciousness.FN85
Empirical evidence backs up the social science. In a study of capital juries from Kentucky, a
substantial proportion (about 66%) of jurors decided the sentence during the guilt phase, even
before hearing evidence regarding aggravating and mitigating factors.FN86 Of those who had
reached a sentencing preference prior to the penalty phase of the trial, 70% were “absolutely
convinced” of their penalty preference before hearing any evidence as to the appropriate sentence,
and an additional 25% were “pretty sure.”FN87 Substantially more of those jurors who had reached a
decision on sentencing prior to the penalty phase were inclined to believe death was the appropriate
penalty rather than life.FN88 Those jurors who ultimately changed their vote from death to life
primarily did so out of a desire to avoid a retrial,FN89 and those who went from life to death
expressed reluctance based on personal beliefs.FN90 Mitigating factors were not generally
considered in either instance.FN91  As Professor Sandys, who has conducted numerous studies of
Kentucky capital juries remarked upon reviewing this evidence, “If this is true, then the guilt phase of
the trial tilts jurors’ penalty preferences toward death.”FN92
Such a result should not be surprising. The manner in which bifurcated capital trials operate makes
the jury’s ability to consider mitigating evidence difficult, even if jurors are abundantly clear what the
law requires. Due to the post-Gregg manifestation of the death penalty, most courts have adopted a
scheme where the jury first considers the issue of guilt, and then, in a separate proceeding, the same
jury considers the issue of punishment. Inevitably, for the jury to even be considering death at the
penalty phase, the jury already has found an aggravating circumstance, as most aggravating
circumstances mirror those the jury considers in determining whether the defendant is guilty of a
capital crime.FN93 Even in the best of circumstances, humanizing a defendant to a jury who has just
found the defendant guilty of a capital crime after hearing in excruciating detail about that crime is
an uphill battle.
Linking back to the issue of jury instructions, the structure of capital penalty hearings also means
that, as a result of the jury finding statutory aggravating factors at the guilt phase, those being
presented in the penalty phase are not being considered in a manner most would hope, and, at the
very least, not consistent with Supreme Court precedent.FN94 Mitigating circumstances get very little
deliberation. One study revealed that many former capital jurors could not recall the mitigating
evidence that was presented in the penalty phase, even when prompted, and those that could
believed that such evidence was irrelevant.FN95
Given the current set-up, even if jurors are clear as to what the law requires for mitigating and
aggravating evidence, there is a significant question as to whether jurors could truly satisfy the
expectations of the Caldwell Court. Evidence seems to support the view that undermining jurors’
sense of responsibility causes them to take their sentencing duty less seriously, and often results in
them failing to carefully deliberate the evidence according to the law. The result is that “defendants
may be getting sentenced to death without the benefit of a jury determination that they are, in fact,
death-eligible.”FN96
How To Help Jurors Accept Moral Responsibility For Their Decisions
Since Caldwell, both Kentucky and federal courts appear to have modified their expectations of
capital jurors, moving away from the focus on moral responsibility and particularized justice, and
focusing, instead, on consistency.FN97 Increasingly, jurors seem to be simply lending facial
legitimacy to the process.FN98 Showing mercy or even acknowledging a defendant’s humanity no
longer appears to be our expectation or hope for capital jurors, and capital jurors likely are relieved
to give up that role as the community conscience.
This Essay highlights one reason to second guess that shift. The accumulated empirical evidence
supports the assumptions on which the Caldwell decision was based. Jurors do, in fact, try to
minimize their role in capital sentencing decisions, which does reduce their feeling of responsibility
for that decision. Prosecutors and judges who highlight and try to downplay the jury’s influence on a
capital defendant’s penalty encourage the jury to further abdicate their decision-making function, a
problem that is only exacerbated by confusing and unclear instructions on evidence of mitigation
and aggravation. The post-Gregg bifurcated trial process further removes jurors from the “awesome
responsibility” of being the community’s moral compass.
Many scholars have called on the Supreme Court to rethink the procedures meant to ensure that
capital punishment is not imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner. That chorus is joined here
by another voice. Even if the Supreme Court does not advance such a move, the state legislature
and/or the Kentucky Supreme Court could implement such changes. Swearing in a second jury to
consider the penalty decision, separate and distinct from the guilt-phase jury, might be one way to
alleviate the inherent bias that comes from a jury who has already decided aggravation and has
made up its mind prior to even hearing evidence on aggravating and mitigating factors. Although it
might add some clunkiness, as well as additional time and cost, to the proceedings, when a decision
as weighty as someone’s life is on the line, the additional administrative burdens are quite minimal.
Kentucky should also consider amending its statute so the jury’s decision is presumed to be reliable
and a judge can change that decision only in certain extraordinary circumstances. Jurors minimize
their role in part because the law is confusing; it tells jurors that they are only recommending a
sentence, but also tells them they are to “fix” the sentence. At the same time, the law permits judges
to impose a different sentence after the jury has fixed it. Although it is this author’s view that
automatic state Supreme Court review of death penalty cases should remain, especially in light of the
high error rate, the jury will only truly feel a sense of responsibility if everyone in the courtroom
knows and believes that the jury plays that sentencing role. Prosecutors and judges would not be
able to downplay juror’s roles, either explicitly or implicitly, if jurors truly are responsible for that
decision.
There also needs to be a way of communicating that juror fears of someone being out on the street
shortly after receiving a life sentence are unrealistic. At the very least, voir dire should be encouraged
on this topic and jury instructions amended to make sure the jury’s understandings are accurate. The
Supreme Court has been clear that if the prosecution asks for execution based on a defendant’s
future dangerousness, the judge must instruct the jurors that the defendant would not be eligible for
parole if they authorize a life sentence.FN99 Rather than responding reactively, informing the jury of
this fact up front might be one way of addressing the issue.
Conclusion
The Court’s death penalty jurisprudence fails to note one of the most basic reasons why jurors can
relatively easily assign responsibility elsewhere: those who authorize the death penalty are inherently
removed from the ultimate result. They are never the one to personally carry out, or even observe,
the execution they authorize.FN100 Even in the best of scenarios, then, juries are inevitably distant
from the repercussions of the most significant ramifications of their decision. The graphic reality of
the pain inflicted through the execution process is never laid out before the jurors who are tasked
with authorizing the death of another.
Given this reality, if jurors are going to be tasked with the “awesome responsibility” of deciding
another person’s fate, they need to have an intimate understanding of the full panoply of realities
surrounding that decision. The level of discomfort jurors feel in making this decision, even without
awareness of the granular details of actually putting someone to death, ultimately provides another
reason to reconsider permitting such a punishment.
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